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THE CASE OF VALENTIN MOISEYEV
The explanations italicized in the text of judgment were made by the editor of the magazine Index N.Nim

Criminal Case No. 14/99

JUDGMENT

In the Name of the Russian Federation

December 16, 1999
City of Moscow

Moscow City Court composed of the Presiding Judge N.S.Kuznetsova, Lay Assessors V.M.Kovalenko and N.G.Sakharov, assisted by Secretaries M.Y.Ignatova and S.S.Lebedkina,

with participation of Procurator I.V.Dubkov and Defense Attorney Y.P.Gervis,

One should pay attention to the fact that the accusation was approved of not simply by the prosecutor Dubkov but by the senior military prosecutor of the Chief Military Prosecution Department. It is unlawful because the accused is not a serviceman.
See juridicial commentary

Having had a closed court hearing regarding the accusation of:

Valentin MOISEYEV, born on March 10, 1946, in Leningrad, ethnic Russian, Russian national, having higher education, married, prior to arrest working as the Deputy Director of the First Asia Department (FAD) of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RF MFA), having the rank of the 2nd Class Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, residing in Moscow at Isakovsky St. , with no previous criminal record,

Nota bene that reffering to some secrets, the accusation not only made the hearing of the case a closed process but also tried to keep the accusatory conclusion from the accused. He was not even given it. Thus, Moiseyev could prepare his own defence only in the investigator's cabinet.

In fact there were no any secrets both in the case and in the Court (except the top secret information about the absolute professional irrelevance of the investigating group).
See juridicial commentary

of the crime under Art. 275 of the RF Penal Code,

THE COURT FOUND:

V.I.Moiseyev, being a citizen of the USSR and later of the Russian Federation, committed state treason in the form of espionage to the detriment of the country's external security.
See juridicial commentary

The crimes were committed under the following circumstances:

V.I.Moiseyev, working at a long-term RF MFA mission from 1992 to January 1994 in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as the [Russian] embassy's First Secretary, was offered to be involved in covert cooperation by the Republic of Korea's intelligence service, Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP), agreed to [such] covert cooperation and was included in the ANSP's active intelligence personnel. Based on his official post, he was given instructions to collect information and classified documents of interest to ANSP, pertaining to the relationships between Russia and North Korea, visits of the Russian Federation's officials to Pyongyang, political, international, and military exchange between Russia and DPRK, as well as information regarding DPRK, in particular, obtaining reports prepared by the Russian embassy in DPRK and MFA of Russia, and other official data; to monitor the situation in the North Korean embassy in Moscow and to document the actions of its staff; to create conditions for determining DPRK's activities in Rusia, including personal contacts with the staff of DPRK's embassy in Russia; to determine the activities of the DPRK's friendship societies.

Terrible but in fact -unsupported by evidence accusations.

" Was recruited to secret collaboration", "agreed to collaborate secretly" - even now all that remains to be such a secret that the investigators still have failed to prove it. Moreover, all that seems to remain an absolute secret for the South Korean Intelligence Service as well. Among the investigatory assumptions there is no evidence at all.
See juridicial commentary

Upon his return to Moscow, from early 1994 through July 3, 1998, having consecutively held the posts of the Chief of the Korea Section and the Director of the First Asia Department of the RF MFA, in order to follow the instruction received, V.I.Moiseyev has been systematically collecting, retaining and providing to the Korean intelligence service data and information of interest to it, doing so, [among other channels], through its regular employee C.S.U., who was acting under cover of an official representative of the Republic of Korea's embassy in Moscow. [V.I.Moiseyev] collected the espionage information by way of directly familiarizing himself with classified documents, photocopying, and perceiving oral information that he learnt as a result of attending various protocol events, meetings, conferences and seminars; prior to handing over photocopies of classified documents, containing classified information, which constituted state secret, [V.I.Moiseyev] kept them in his office in the MFA building. In order to hand over [documents] and maintain the espionage contacts with ANSP in Russia, [V.I.Moiseyev] used the terms used by this intelligence service as to the locations of meetings with ANSP representatives, time periods between [such] meetings, and covering-up [such] meetings as official contacts with a representative of the Republic of Korea's embassy in Moscow. Complying with the ANSP's terms, V.I.Moiseyev has participated in at least 80 secret meetings with its representative C.S.U. since early 1994 through July 3, 1998

It isn't worth paying attention to but some tricks can admire everyone. Moiseyev "covered" his contacts with the South Korean diplomat interpreting them as "contacts with the representator of the South Korean Embassy in Moscow". Well done
See juridicial commentary

and handed over to the South Korean intelligence service classified information, constituting state secret, that he had collected following its instructions: on Russia's position and approach to the friendly relationships, friendship and cooperation with DPRK, described in two draft agreements between the two countries; in the field of military cooperation, related to implementation of the agreement between Russia and DPRK on a device in the arms area and completion of the functioning in DPRK of a Russian device in the intelligence area, contained in the 1997 stable memorandum of the Korea Section of the FAD of the RF MFA. V.I.Moiseyev has personally made copies of these documents by their photocopying and kept them in his own office prior to handing over; Classified information, constituting state secret: in the field of military cooperation, contained in a letter to the RF Ambassador to DPRK, dated 09.19.94; and on Russia's proposal to start closed talks in the field of military cooperation; on termination of the Russian-North Korean agreement in the field of military intelligence, contained in the resolution forwarded to the RF MFA from the RF embassy in DPRK on 06.11.96; on the position of Russia's Ministry of Defense as to the existing agreement between Russia and DPRK; information in the field of politically important international relations between Russia and DPRK, contained in two materials dated 03.14.96 and related to citizen C.M.G.; and other information that did not contain state secrets, having handed over copies of twenty-three documents and at least thirty-five pieces of information orally in relation to various aspects of [Russian-North Korean] relations. In 1997, having received from citizen C.S.U. an espionage assignment to collect information in the form of a list of documents that were of interest to ANSP, V.I.Moiseyev produced and in the same period handed over, as requested by the list, copies of 20 classified documents available to him, in the form of protocols and agreements on cooperation between Russia and DPRK in a number of areas.

A great list of documents. But besides the fact that the transference of the information wasn't proved, there is a convincing confirmation that there was no need for that either. For one thing all those documents don't contain any secret information and for another thing all those information is easy to find in open sources which are accessable for any diplomat (and even for any citizen).
See juridicial commentary

For his criminal cooperation with the ANSP V.I.Moiseyev, during the period between 1994 and 1998, has been remunerated by the South Korean intelligence service in the amount of at least 14 thousand US dollars.

Both during the investigation and in the Court no real fact of getting money by Moiseyev was proved. 5747 $ which were taken away during the search in Moiseyev's flat and at his work place were performed as the evidence during the investigation and in the Court - the money which were honestly earned and kept by family for a long time.

During the flat search as much as 4600$ (family accumulations) were taken away. They were inclosed in the envelope and brought away. Later at the legal procedure of inspection of the withdrawed materials this money was already inclosed in several envelopes, each with the seal of the South Korean Embassy and the name Moiseyev as the addressee. Now this disgraceful forgery is established and proved. But the Court prefered not to notice the fact.

The sum of 14000 $ only demonstrates what sums FSB conciders appropriate to be paid for a spy activity.
See juridicial commentary

V.I.Moiseyev did not plead guilty and testified that in connection with his service and academic activities he personally knew staff member of the Republic of Korea's embassy C.S.U. They were on good terms and frequently met in restaurants and in Moiseyev's apartment; their families were friends. He did not know that C.S.U. was employed by the ANSP, did not suspect this and no one has told him this. He never agreed, either orally or in written, to be involved in espionage for ANSP. He was not involved in collection, retention or handing over any information to the South Korean intelligence service, either through C.S.U. or otherwise. The information he exchanged with C.S.U. was of academic interest and did not constitute state secret. He was arrested on July 3, 1998, in his apartment immediately after C.S.U. had left. In the apartment he handed over to C.S.U. his academic report on Korean affairs and a few photographs of himself, North Koreans and high-ranking officials of the RF MFA. These photographs were selected by C.S.U. himself, as [V.I.Moiseyev] believes, in order to show to his young daughter and not in relation to any espionage activities. At the initial stage of the investigation, interrogated in the absence of an attorney, he incriminated himself because of the psychological pressure and threats on the part of persons who interrogated him.

The explanations are needed here. All Moiseyev's arguments are confirmed by witnesses's evidence and objective proves fixed in the case.

But what very important is a quite dull mention of confessions which were got by criminal methods and which Moiseyev denied as soon as he was given an opportunity to use the help of defender.

Moiseyev's relatives at the beginning were deprived of the opportunity of using the defender's help as the investigation announced that Moiseyev had refused it. Such a trick together with the pressure, blackmail and threats that were used by the investigation to make Moiseyev slander himself - all that is not only "certain investigating actions" but the real crime itself.

Although V.I.Moiseyev did not plead guilty, his guilt, apart from his own testimony, is proven by the following circumstances:

his own testimony in the course of investigation, where he, on July 4, 1998, confirmed that he had met C.S.U. before his departure for Seoul, had meetings with him in Seoul arranged by [C.S.U.], upon his return from Seoul they had meetings in Moscow, and that they would meet 3 or 4 times only in cafes and restaurants and later often in Moiseyev's apartment (vol. 2, p. 4); On July 8, 1998, [V.I.Moiseyev] confirmed that, in violation of his commitment not to divulge information that constitutes state secret or classified information, which he would learn through his office, he did not report to his superiors on every specific contact with C.S.U.; that he conveyed and handed over to him classified documents and information, initially suspecting and since 1996 knowing for sure that C.S.U. represented the ANSP, receiving remuneration for this regularly, approximately once a month [in the amount of] 500 US dollars; that in February 1995 or 1996 C.S.U. paid him 2,000 US dollars, and in April 1998 1,000 US dollars, giving this money in envelopes (vol. 2, pp. 25-30); Respectively on July 9 and 13 and on August 10, 12 and 14, 1998, [V.I.Moiseyev] confirmed that he had handed over to C.S.U. copies of the draft agreements, a copy of the stable memorandum on the military situation; informed C.S.U. of the North Korean's intent to purchase a Russian device in the arms field, that he clarified for C.S.U. the issue of citizen C.S.U. and the successor of K. (vol. 2, pp. 51-55; 105; 36-37; 111-114; 115-122). At the July 13, 1998, interrogation he testified that knowing for sure that C.S.U. was a regular employee of the South Korean intelligence service, ANSP, he had satisfied [C.S.U.'s] requests to hand over to him copies of classified documents he was interested in, knowing well that C.S.U. would not have been able to obtain such documents in any other way, since there was no official exchange of such documents between the Republic of Korea's embassy and Russian Federation MFA (vol. 2, pp. 51-55);

In the course of interrogations on July 4, 9 and 13 and on August 11, 12, 14 and 16, 1998, [V.I.Moiseyev] confirmed that he had handed over and conveyed to C.S.U. the most part of other information of classified nature, and identified this information (vol. 2, pp. 7-9; 36-42; 53-54).

So, the basis of proovs consists of the confessions which were teared by unlawful methods while Moiseyev was deprived of the right to have defender's help.
See juridicial commentary

[V.I.Moiseyev's ] confession in the course of interrogation is objectively supported by the following proof: testimony of witness K.G.B. that virtually all documents prepared by the MFA and containing assessments of the political or economic situation in a country, as well as those of developing bilateral relations in various areas of Russia's cooperation with other countries are of confidential nature and are not to be divulged or handed over to any other country; same witness, as well as witnesses I.A.T. and M.A.I. during the investigation (vol. 3, pp. 10-15, 22-33, 40-46, 47-51) and witnesses T.G.D. and M.L.P. both during he investigation and at trial confirmed that [V.I.Moiseyev] by nature of his office had had access to all official documents and information available regarding all issues that had been of interest to the South Korean side; witnesses I.A.T., M.A.I. and T.G.D. confirmed that they had known about C.S.U.'s involvement with the South Korean intelligence service ANSP, and [V.I.Moiseyev] should also have known about this fact; witnesses I.A.T. and T.G.D. additionally testified that they had noticed good knowledge of the issues of which the South Korean side had not been supposed to be informed;

Pay attention to verbal tricks. The documents have "confidential" character. Isn't it frightening? Later "confidentional" transformed into "secret", after that the fact of knowing information was interpreted as the existance of opportunity for transference it. All this leads to the immediate conclusion: Moiseyev gave away secret information. Now it is already terrible.
See juridicial commentary

Just imagine! In February, 1997, Russian External Intelligence Service passes to FSB an axtract from Moiseyev's personal file (as if this file was formed by South Korean Intelligence Service) which explained how the South Korean Intelligence Service works with Moiseyev. For more than a year giving no information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Chekists were looking after a high-ranked diplomat being sure that he was an enemy agent.

For all this period no convincing proof of his spying activity was found. Detention of the resident caught red-handed was organized exactly at the moment when he has a scientific lecture, delivered by Moiseyev at a public seminar beforehand.

It might be crying carelessness or real high treason.

But everything is simplier. So soundly declared document is only a xerocopy in Korean which says that a certain person (FSB affirms that it is Moiseyev) was recruited to collaboration.

There are no any indications or prooves that this paper relates to somethingf at all. Its origin is unknown. It is unknown as well where it came from, how it was linked with South Korean Intelligence Service, who and for what purpose wrote it and how FSB has got it. It's just a xerocopy of some text without any publishing imprint, authorship and any indications that let consider this paper to be a document. There is no any information about operative and investigative activities which led to appearing of the paper. The accusation says - there is such a paper

Just think, you are accused of a crime and a paper which says that you are a criminal is used as a proof. Who is the author? Where was it got? It's not important
See juridicial commentary

Such his statement is supported by the copies of surveillance reports and reports on an operative [investigative] measure involving wiretapping on V.I.Moiseyev's telephone conversations during the period from September 17, 1996, to July 3, 1998, which suggest that since January 1996 through May 1998 C.S.U. had 41 meetings with V.I.Moiseyev in his apartment, as well as in a number of Moscow restaurants, and during the period from September 17, 1996, to July 3, 1998, made 66 telephone calls to V.I.Moiseyev; in the course of telephone conversation they, as a rule, only appointed locations and times for meetings (vol. 9, pp. 176-177; vol. 1, pp. 81-89, 90-93);

V.I.Moiseyev's testimony that he received remuneration for the information he had handed over is confirmed by the search reports, in the course of which [search] US dollars were found both in his office and in his apartment; witnesses P., as well as T.L.N. and B.S.N, confirmed that US dollars had been found at V.I.Moiseyev's residence in various amounts, packed in nonstandard envelopes; V.I.Moiseyev himself, as well as his wife and daughter, examined at trial in response to his motion, confirmed that they had not raised any objections as to the discovery of US dollars during the search, and the court therefore recognizes as material evidence 1,100 US dollars, found and seized during the search in V.I.Moiseyev's office in his office safe box; 4,647 US dollars, found and seized during the search in the apartment at his residence and 7 paper envelopes containing US dollars (vol. 1, pp. 95-100; 102-105; 154-156; vol. 6, pp. 35-43; 45-48; vol. 5, pp. 7-9; vol. 8 - JVC videotape; vol. 10, p. 113);

Well. This is absolutely intolerable for the Court. It's necessary at least to play justice. As for the envelopes it was proved exactly the contrtary. Nice Court! The accusation is waving with the envelopes made with its own hands. The protocol of research, bystanders and mainly the witnesses - deny this poppycock. They are heard graciously and after that the judge thoughtlessly repeated the conjectures of the accusation.
See juridicial commentary

The court trusts the testimony of [this] witness and recognizes as material evidence said photographs, report and a photocopy of the typed list of Russian-North Korean treaties and agreements in Korean language on 8 pages, since the photographs and the report had been handed over by V.I.Moiseyev to C.S.U. in the course of [his] espionage activities,

That is an argument. It's considered to be a proof because it was passed in a spy activity process. It means that in a process of friendly relations all these facts have no any spying character - no secrets, no damage. According to such logic the spying work itself might be proved by passing the same materials. An ideal circle. No spy will break free.

and the 8-page documents had been received [by V.I.Moiseyev] from C.S.U. as an espionage assignment; as requested by the list, he produced copies of the documents and handed them over to C.S.U., which, in turn, is confirmed by said material evidence (vol. 1, pp. 132-151; 104; 132-140; vol. 5, pp. 18; 21-39); fingerprint examination report (vol. 4, pp. 20-30); reports on examinations of offices at the location of [V.I.Moiseyev's] employment, where the Korea Section's files and a copy machine, used by V.I.Moiseyev to produce copies of documents, were kept, and a report of the examination conducted to check authenticity and secrecy level of the documents, stating that treaties, protocols and plans listed in the document examined are available at the Korea Section of the FAD RF MFA (vol. 6, pp. 136-140; vol. 4, p. 131).

The same logic. The Court considers it to be a proof of espionage because it was committed as a result of espionage task. It means that if Moiseyev did it, I say, at his wife's request - these documents could prove nothing.
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Accuracy of information, contained in the draft Order on reorganization of the operations of ANSP's residency in Moscow for 1997 in relation to V.I.Moiseyev rather than any other person were confirmed and substantiated at trial by witnesses P. and M.;
See juridicial commentary

The report of the examination that checked the secrecy level of the information handed over by V.I.Moiseyev, conducted during the investigation and at trial, confirms that

constitute state secret (vol. 5, pp. 181-186; 113-154; court record).

The court trusts these reports since they confirm that said information discloses the content of the Russian foreign policy, agreements on interaction with foreign countries in the field of military cooperation and military intelligence, as well as politically important information.

It's a poppycock.

The same experts took different decisions about secrecy of the foregoing documents. Well, it's really difficult to make a decision when various translations of supposedly one and the same document are given for expert examination.
See juridicial commentary

Therefore, having reviewed and assessed the evidence produced and the videotapes reviewed at trial, the court finds V.I.Moiseyev's guilt proven and qualifies his acts under art. 275 of the RF Penal Code, as V.I.Moiseyev, being a citizen of the USSR and later of the Russian Federation, committed state treason in the form of espionage by disclosing information containing a state secret to a foreign intelligence service, which harmed the country's external security; [he] also collected, retained for the purposes of handing over, and handed over to a foreign intelligence service other information to be used to the detriment of Russia's external security.

Having reviewed at trial V.I.Moiseyev's theory of his innocence of state treason in the form of espionage, the court found that when he had confessed during the investigation, no illegal methods of interrogation had been used against him, which is supported by interrogation records.

This is the main masterpiece of our justice.

The accused asks, begs to let him exercise his legitimate right for the defense. The investigator pulled a long nose (and this was the softest answer). The Court didn't take a blind bit of notice anything unlawful. By the way, these investigative methods were never verified.
See juridicial commentary

Moreover, in order to check the theory of his innocence the court subpoenaed and questioned as witnesses his wife and daughter, mandatory search eyewitnesses, a person who had participated in the search at [V.I.Moiseyev] residence and having the information on the draft order on the organization of ANSP residency operations in Moscow for 1997; a translation of said document was made by a professional translator. The professional translation of said document confirmed rather than disproved that all information contained therein concerns V.I.Moiseyev only; the information received by the foreign intelligence service from V.I.Moiseyev is recorded accurately and professionally in detail.

There is a person (I'd like to look at his face) who was interrogated but said nothing about the way how this "document" had been got, who could not prove its connection with South Korean Intelligence Service. The person only said: "It is written in Korean that Moiseyev is a spy. If you don't believe, translate and read it yourself".

They did and satisfied themselves of the fact that it was really written. Then what? The godsend for plays of absurdity.

It I find somewhere a paper in German which says "Putin is a spy" will Putin also be convicted? No? It's a pity.

Upon V.I.Moiseyev's motion, the court subpoenaed the experts who had, during the investigation, conducted the examination on the secrecy level of the information conveyed to the foreign intelligence service; [these experts] reviewed the text of the document, produced by the professional translator, at trial and confirmed the accuracy of [their] conclusions made during the investigation and substantiated them.

Each of these pieces of evidence as well as the whole body of evidence reviewed at trial completely disproves V.I.Moiseyev's theory of his innocence.

Recognizing that V.I.Moiseyev provided all the information identified by the investigators to the foreign intelligence service as thereby instructed, the court proceeds from V.I.Moiseyev's own testimony that he was ex officio familiar with the specific documents and information both prior and after their drafting, and therefore finds that V.I.Moiseyev has had a reasonable opportunity to convey the information even during a short-term business trip.

The fact that he had an opportunity to do it already means he did.
See juridicial commentary

In sentencing that court takes into account the nature and degree of danger of the crime and the personality of Moiseyev, who is prosecuted for the first time, has a family and is positively characterized by his employer; his health condition.

The court finds no circumstances aggravating his responsibility.

Based on the nature and degree of danger of the crime and the personality of Moiseyev and in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the court sentences Moiseyev to a punishment involving deprivation of liberty for a minimal term provided for by art. 275 of the RF Penal Code with confiscation of property; the court sends [Moiseyev] for serving his term to a high-security correction facility without serving part of sentence in jail, as prescribed by art. 58 of the RF Penal Code; taking into account Moiseyev's personality, the court does not sentence him to any additional punishment provided for in art. 48 of the RF Penal Code; the court appoints confiscation of the property previously arrested in the course of investigation (vol. 1, pp. 110-112; 118-124; 116-117; 125-128).

Based on the above and as prescribed by art. 301-303 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, the court

RULED:

Valentin MOISEYEV is found guilty of committing a crime under art. 275 of the RF Penal Code and sentenced to deprivation of liberty for the period of 12 (twelve) years and confiscation of property. The term shall be served in a high-security correction facility and commence on July 4, 1998.

Confiscation shall apply to the property previously arrested (vol. 1, pp. 110-112; 118-124; 116-117; 125-128).

As required by art. 86(4) of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, the material evidence [consisting of] 5,747 (five thousand seven hundred forty seven) US dollars shall be confiscated for the benefit of the state; As required by art. 86(5) of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, the material evidence [consisting of] the list of Russian-North Korean treaties and agreements in the Korean language on 8 pages; report "Russian Policy on the Korean Peninsula"; 4 photographs and 7 envelopes shall be kept with the case file as documents.

The restraint measure in the form of incarceration shall remain the same.

The judgment may be appealed and protested before the RF Supreme Court within 7 days from the day of its pronouncement; the convict may appeal within the same period of time from the day of receipt of a copy of the judgment.

Presiding Judge N.S.Kuznetsova

Lay Assessors V.M.Kovalenko, N.G.Sakharov

Copy Attested:

Judge

Secretary

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