CONTENT The Magazine 'Index/Dossier na Tsenzuru' Home page
THE CASE OF VALENTIN MOISEYEV

Russian policy on the Korean peninsula

Because of the geographical situation and as a result of historical development the Korean Peninsula is a central point of interests of the countries adjoining to it - Russia, China and Japan and also the USA. During Cold war the main watershed of these interests lay on the line of ideological confrontation and support South or North, though it didn't exclude interbloc contradictions for a rivalry between Moscow and Beijing for influence on Pyongyang.
The end of Cold war in the world has not resulted in its liquidation in Korea from the point of view of the interkorean relations. But it altered approaches of "the four" to the Korean problem, not excluding, however, and to some extent even strengthening the contradictions inside it. All the four countries undoubtedly act for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as well as for peace settlement of existing problems. However, common interest in it doesn't automatically means single political line, and the process of settlement - its form, time and final result - can be and should be regarded by them differently proceeding from their regional and global interests. First of all it depends on the fact, whether they are interested in unification of Korea, and what kind of state they want it to be from the point of view of external policy they conduct. United Korea will be economically and military rather powerful country, its foreign policy will influence a situation in North-East Asia and that's why it's important whether it will be neutral and completely independent or will be involved in the sphere of influence of one of the "four" state.
If beforehand contradictions were concentrated around the support of the Korean ally, now they cover all the Peninsula and all aspects of the Korean settlement. They are not of confrontation character, but are the result of the national interests of each separate country, realized through out the structure of relations with both Korean states, where North Korea is of special importance because of its social-economic organization as well as its approaches to general Korean problems.
Finally the balance of interests of the "four" states, including their contradictions, guaranteed peace on the Korean Peninsula during Cold war. The balance of interests is necessary now in order to ensure the prediction of the situation development on the Peninsula and to exclude an opportunity of playing "a game" by one of the Korean sides on the relations with any involved state opposing another Korean side.
Russia is historically involved in the Korean Peninsula affairs as a state which have common border with Korea. The situation developing here is practically important for us as Russia is vitally interested in peace and stability near its Far East boundaries. By virtue of geopolitical reasons Russia as no one else is interested in Korea's unification from which it can only win. Firstly, the long-term center of intensity on the Russia's Far East borders will be liquidated and situation in the North-East Asia will impose in general. The unified Korea with its powerful economic and human potential will change geographical situation in this region and will become the essential factor determining a situation in the region. Taking into account indisputable and friendly character of Russian-Korean relation in the past and at the present moment we can be sure that they will have the same features in the future. From the economic point of view in the case of Korea's unification Russia will get a reliable partner for cooperation with its Siberian and Far East regions.
The establishing of the diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul in 1990 was a result of comprehension of existing realities by Soviet leaders in the frames of Gorbachev's "policy of a new thinking". It objectively widened the sphere of political and economic opportunities for Moscow on the Korean Peninsula and did not mean change of orientation from Pyongyang to Seoul at all.
At the end of 80-th North Korea was one of the largest importers of Soviet military technical devices. In economic area more than 50 joint projects including building an atomic station in DPRK were under consideration. Now it's also erroneous to say about Russia's aspiration to equal remoteness from DPRK and ROK because, firstly, our relations with both Korean states have no direct dependence and, secondly, have different contents.
In Moscow it was expected that deep connections with Pyongyang in a combination with intentionally demonstrated at that time Seoul's interest in strengthening the relations will allow it to play the main role in Korean settlement and Korean affairs as a whole. Dissolving of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the process of democratization in Russia in addition to well-known mistakes of new Russian diplomacy, have led, however, to other results.
Firstly, by virtue of objective reasons Russia had refused to help DPRK in economic and military area. At the same time an amount of Russian-North Korean commercial, economic and political cooperation was sharply reduced. From the ideological allies with all following consequences Moscow and Pyongyang have turned into ideological antagonists. In fact the relations with North Korea have changed in the same way as the Russia's relation with its other former ideological allies, but this time on the different background: with retaining of socio-economic structure in DPRK and strengthening of connections with the main Pyongyang's "opponent" - Seoul.
In such conditions the importance of Russia for North Korea, which in political sphere as well as in economical and military development oriented and based in decisive degree on our country, has sharply fallen as sharply reduced an opportunity for Moscow to influence Pyongyang in the channel of its own interests.
Secondly, Seoul's attitude to Moscow has changed. Seoul from our point of view in its "Northern policy" proceeded first of all from interkorean confrontation and desire to get a channel of influence the North through its nearest ally and in this way to ensure a settlement on the Korean Peninsula on the acceptable to Seoul conditions. Russia's economic difficulties have not allowed the Seoul's hopes for wide economic cooperation and access to the Russia's new resources to come true.
Thus both Korean states in the beginning of the 90-th ceased to consider Russia as a partner who could significantly influence the situation in Korea. But it certainly didn't mean at all that Russia gave in her positions. The Russia's opportunities to stand for its approaches temporarily decreased, but national interests, which they were based on, have not disappeared. Realizing this fact and taking into account potentialities and political weight of Russia, North and South have not broken their desire to win her over, they recognize Russia's involvement in Korean problems.
At the same time it's obvious that the South Koreans despite of the opposite official declarations and contrary to the arrangement achieved in the joint communique at establishing diplomatic relations which announced to build bilateral connections without damage to the third countries, want as a minimum to fix and better - to deepen a crack in the relations between Moscow and Pyongyang in order to isolate North Korea and at the end to achieve such situation when Russia like many other countries would coordinate the steps in the North Korean direction with South Korea. And as for Pyongyang there would be no alternative for it to have relations with somebody else but with Seoul. The proof of it is a wide campaign to discredit Russian-North Korean cooperation in timber cutting on the pretext of human rights violation, consistent pushing Russia to cancel Russia-DPRK state treaty about friendship, cooperation and mutual help dated 1961, oversensitive attitude to the contents of the new state treaty, appeals to hamper military-technical cooperation with Pyongyang, use the themes of Russian-South Korean connection in their propaganda to the North, etc.
The North Koreans are interested in Russia for counteraction to growing USA influence the Korean Peninsula as well as for retaining here Russian-Chinese rivalry, from which DPRK always had essential political and economic benefits. The traditional character of our relations also plays an important role. It's warmed by hopes that Russia's opposition could come to power. Last reason actually in certain degree explanes obvious aspiration of the North Koreans to delay coordination of new state treaty which is called to replace a former one.
In January, 1997 in Pyongyang and in June of the same year in Moscow two rounds of negotiations at the level of deputy ministers of foreign affairs of Russia and DPRK were held. In march the talks at the level of the directors of territorial departments of Ministers of Foreign Affairs took place.
Offering to conclude a new interstate treaty, Russia first of all proceeded from the fact that the previous agreement concluded during Cold war did not reflect new realities which developed in the world and in its policy on the Korean Peninsula. The 1961 Treaty reflected bloc structure of the world and international relations and was aimed at protection the existing in DPRK regime (article 1). A new treaty does not at all encroach upon present social-political system in DPRK but at the same time it doesn't assume any obligations from Russian side to its protection. Its purpose is to move legal base under the real existing relations, for Russia in spite of the fact that the 1961 Treaty is still formally valid, officially declared that it will not consider itself automatically involved in the conflict on the Korean Peninsula in case of its occurrence. Moreover, both Russia and DPRK officially declared that 1961 Treaty actually doesn't work. The Russian side doesn't pursue any other purposes.
It seems that North Koreans have different approach to legal base of the relations with Russia. On one hand their tactics is based on a plan to keep the previous treaty as long as possible. They need it, firstly, because they don't exclude the restoration of former political system in our country and consequently returning to the relations of "socialist internationalism".
Secondly, reserving 1961 Treaty legally impose the obligation on Russia and allow the North Koreans in certain situation to raise a claim, flowing from it (according to a principle: let it be shaky, unreliable but ally, than absence of those at all). Thirdly, Pyongyang understands that even a formal presence of ally's Treaty with Moscow is an irritation for the Moscow-Seoul relations. And, at last, ally's relations with Russia are widely used by North Korea in its game on the contradictions between the countries, involved in the Korean affairs.
On the other hand, realizing hopelessness of maintaining military union with Russia, when situation both in our country and in the world has changed, the North Koreans try to include into a new interstate treaty their formula of regulation in the country (creation of confederation on the basis of principles of independence, peaceful unification and great national consolidation). In this way as it's obvious they pursue the purpose, firstly, to achieve Russia's recognition of their formula as the only possible for Korean settlement and thus to get out support in its realization. It means again to make Russia an ally in solving the central problem both for DPRK and ROK with all the consequences following from it for bilateral interaction in the field of political cooperation, economy and defense. Theoretically such ally's relations can little differ from those existed in the past. Certainly, it doesn't suit Russia at all. Moreover, in practice such an involvement into Korean affairs on the DPRK side is impossible to achieve.
In any case the conversation on this topic is profitable for the North Koreans as it delays coordination of the new treaty text for uncertain time.
For this reason among the three rounds of negotiations of treaty only at the first one took place a real discussion of the text. The other two rounds in fact were completely devoted to North Korean's attempts to prove "fairness" of their way of solving Korean problem.
Moscow and Pyongyang are interested in maintaining political dialogue on a high level, interrupted in the beginning of the 90-th. Its restoration was substantially promoted by a visit of Duma delegation headed by its speaker G.N.Seleznev (May, 1996) and former deputy chairman of the government V.I.Ignatenko (April). A visit of Minister of foreign affairs E.M.Primakov to DPRK is planned this year.
The Russian side was ready to conduct this visit at the end of July. It offered a program of the visit which included the meeting of E.M.Primakov with Kim Chen Il. "Having welcomed cordially " and confirmed offered by us date of the visit Kim En Nam, however declared that "Kim Chen Il doesn't deal with questions of foreign policy" and that's why it's impossible to arrange a meeting with him. Under such circumstances Moscow decided to postpone the visit till the end of the year when Kim Chen Il is officially going to become the head of the state.
Unfortunately it's not our first unsuccessful attempt to establish direct contacts with the leader of North Korea. Taking into account the fact that Kim Chen Il really doesn't receive official foreign delegations, we offered in February this year to send an "unofficial special representative of the Russian leadership" for meeting with him. As such representative a professional specialist in Korean area N.M.Shubnikov was chosen. This former USSR ambassador to DPRK since 1957 repeatedly met with Kim Chen Il including informal meeting and thus knows him well. The North Koreans refused to organize his meeting with the Supreme leader of the country, though they offered him to meet with any other leader.
The reason of Kim Chen Il's persistent deviation from obvious politically favorable for DPRK meeting apparently lies in his individuality which can be proved by a number of other symptoms.
From the economic point of view the Russia's role for DPRK is very important, for the break of economic connections is the main external reason for industrial crisis in DPRK. The North Koreans admit this fact, trying however, to explain all the economic problems only by this.
In this area a serious upheaval in relations has happened recently. Two sessions of an Intergovernmental Russian-Korean commission on trade-economic, scientific and technical cooperation were held, during which the basic ways of revival of mutually advantageous economic connections were planned with taking into account a turning of Russian economy to market principles. It also was the aim of an agreement about economic and technical cooperation, signed in October, 1997, which provides state support in realization of four projects: placing accommodations for re-making crude-oil at the chemical "Synry" association, built at out assistance, by modernization of available and creating new capacities in Radjin-Sonbon, joint exploitation of metallurgical association named in honor of Kim Chack, in reconstruction and developing of which our specialist also took part, the project of drawing Russian participants in a free trade-economic zone Rajin-Sonbon, joint mining of layer of coking coal in Republic Sakha (Yakutia).
In practice this agreement has already began to work. In April the Administration of Kemerovo area and the Ministry of metallurgical industry of DPRK signed a protocol according to which Kuzbas would deliver coke coal to DPRK (30 thousand ton a month in April-May and till the end of the year about 100 thousand ton a month). Kemerovo in its turn would receive pig-iron (minus expenses for its making) which is realized in third countries, including South Korea.
Kemerovo's specialists have also expressed their readiness to take part in technical reconstruction and modernization of the metal plant.
In this year the Far East trade-industrial company signed a contract about delivery of 2 million ton of crude-oil for manufacturing at Synry-2 enterprise. It will ensure annual loading of the Korean enterprise.
The Russian company Vostokchermet and Korean enterprise Saryback concluded an agreement about cutting on metal in DPRK the Russian vessels which served out their time of validity (till 10 thousand ton per year).
Russia is ready to renew a military, military-technical cooperation with DPRK which, however, shouldn't contradict our international obligations and brake by our own estimation the balance of forces in the region. In the beginning of June a representative delegation of Rosvooruzhenie visited DPRK, where it got acquainted with military enterprises of DPRK in order to renew cooperation.
Thus Russian-North Korean relations despite of existing difficulties have obvious tendency to development. This tendency will increase especially in the case if Russia's economic opportunities expand. It will promote a strengthening of our country's role on the Korean Peninsula in the settlement of difficult complex of its problems.

V.Moiseyev

CONTENT | top